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Abstract: Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insur-
gency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses
this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban
as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that
organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charis-
matic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of
support. This support, buttressed by Talib reinforcements from Pakistan’s
border areas, is enough to frustrate the U.S.-led Coalition’s counterinsurgency
strategy. At the operational level, the Taliban is fighting a classic ‘‘war of the
flea,’’ while the Coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the
Taliban ‘‘game plan.’’ This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan
one Pashtun village at a time.
A
fter nearly thirty years of continuous war in Afghanistan, the country’s
American-backed, post-Taliban government is now struggling.
President Hamid Karzai’s government is encountering extreme
difficulty extending control and mandate outside Kabul into the country’s
hinterland regions. Undermining President Karzai’s efforts to build a truly
national government with national control is a resurgent Taliban backed by Al
Qaeda, which together are mounting an increasingly virulent insurgency,
especially in the east and south, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested in May 2003 that the
war in Afghanistan was in a ‘‘cleanup’’ phase,1 now, nearly five years since
1 Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘War on Terrorism in ‘Cleanup’ Phase,’’ Washington Times, May 2,
2003.
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the conclusion of major Operation Enduring Freedom combat operations, it is
clear that Afghanistan is anything but a stable country. The twin insurgencies of
the revitalized Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction of Hizb-i-Islami
(HiG) are growing steadily in strength and influence, while Kabul’s control and
influence in a broad swath of the country are rapidly diminishing. As demon-
strated by the deadly anti-American riots in the capital in May 2006, political
volatility is even starting to reach urban areas.
The chief purpose of the resurged Taliban/Al Qaeda/HiG insurgency
appears to be to force the U.S. military to fight the war according to the
‘‘Taliban game plan.’’ The priority of U.S. effort seems to be on the ‘‘kill/
capture mission,’’ just as the Taliban desires, with the U.S. and NATO forces
concentrating on battalion-sized sweep operations which are consistently
failing, just as they failed in Vietnam. With the U.S. military focused on
countering the Taliban game plan, every uphill battle is a losing one and will
continue to be until a new strategy is implemented. Currently, the best strategy
would be focused coordination of a dramatically increased Provincial Recon-
struction Team (PRT) presence and massive economic development. The
Afghan population has to see tangible results from the Karzai government’s
efforts in order for it to gain legitimacy with them. That is the best way of
winning against the Taliban, which for now has good chances of returning.
We attempt here to shed new light on the idea of the Taliban. Behind
all actions lie ideas, and the current Western perception of the Taliban, both in
academia and in policy circles, centers on the belief that the Taliban are
primarily an obtuse, radical Islamist organization. The Islamist element of the
Taliban may be simply that—an element of the complex historical and tribal
phenomenon of the Pashtuns—but this article assesses other aspects of the
Taliban, such as its tribal dynamics and charisma. We then analyze the effects
of the current insurgency from the strategic and operational levels and
examine its implications for U.S. and Coalition forces’ strategy and tactics.
We assume that the insurgency stems from three fundamental problems: (1)
the lack of state formation and the inability of the national government to
establish a significant presence throughout the country, (2) the failure to make
the rural areas secure so that development and reconstruction can proceed,
and (3) the lack of any meaningful improvement in the lives of the great
majority of the people in the southern half of the country.
Making Sense of the Taliban
‘‘A host of wandering Talib-ul-ilums, who correspond with the theological students in
Turkey and live free at the expense of the people. . . .’’ — Winston Churchill, 18982
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Popular Western perceptions of the Taliban movement have been
driven by images of robed, bearded men toting Qurans and guns and
instituting draconian social policies while harboring global jihadists. While
these images are accurate to a degree, understanding the Taliban requires
more subtle analysis of Afghanistan’s Soviet occupation and post-occupation
experience, its Islamic traditions, Afghan ethno-linguistic and tribal phenom-
ena, interlopers of the frontier border areas with Pakistan, and the context in
which the Taliban rose.
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan deteriorated
into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups, many of which had
spent much of their energy fighting each other even during the height
of the anti-Soviet jihad. This civil war claimed thousands of lives and
decimated the country’s infrastructure. The civil war intensified after a
mujahideen group took Kabul in April 1992. Shortly afterwards, Beirut-style
street fighting erupted in the city, especially between the Pashtun HiG
and the Tajik Jamaat-i-Islam. This civil war, fought with the vast surplus
ordnance of the covert anti-Soviet military aid program and huge stockpiles of
abandoned Soviet weapons, eventually wreaked as much if not more
damage and destruction on the country than the Soviet invasion and
occupation. Kabul, which was left virtually untouched under Soviet
occupation, was savagely bombarded with rockets, mortars, and artillery
by Hekmatyar. In Kandahar, fighting between Islamists and traditionalist
mujahideen parties resulted in the destruction of much of the traditional
power structures. In the rural areas, warlords, drug lords, and bandits ran
amok in a state of anarchy created by the unraveling of the traditional tribal
leadership system.
As the mujahideen factions and warlords were fighting each other for
power, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the region, most notably funding
madrassas (religious boarding schools) in Pakistan that sought to spread the
conservative Wahhabi version of Islam practiced in the Saudi kingdom.
Pakistan’s Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami (JUI) party built a network of its own to
extend the influence of the indigenous Deobandi School of Islamic thought.
These madrassas would come to serve as an important educational alternative
for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet jihad and Afghan
civil war as well as for poor families along the frontier who could not afford the
secular schools. With the oversight of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISID), which had grownweary of their favorite Afghanmujahideen
leader, Hekmatyar, the Taliban emerged from the madrassas of Pakistan’s
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the federally administered tribal area
(FATA), not to mention kinship networks inside the remaining Afghan refugee
camps. In Afghanistan, the Taliban recruited primarily from madrassas near
Ghazni and Kandahar. It arrived on the Afghan scene in 1994 with little
warning and vowed to install a traditional Islamic government and end
the fighting among the mujahideen. With massive covert assistance from
Afghanistan
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Pakistan’s ISID, Army, and Air Force, it overthrew the largely Tajik
(and northern) mujahideen regime in Kabul, capturing the capital in
September 1996. The Taliban considered this regime responsible for a
continuing civil war and the deterioration of security in country, as well
as discrimination against Pashtuns. Afghanistan soon became a training
ground for Islamic activists and other radicals from the Middle East and
around Asia.
War-weary Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban, which promoted
itself as a new force for honesty and unity and was seen as the desperately
needed balm of peace and stability by many Afghans, particularly fellow
Pashtuns. The Taliban immediately targeted warlords who were deemed
responsible for much of the destruction, instability, and chaos that plagued
the country since the outbreak of the civil war. But it also instituted a religious
police force, the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai An Munkir (Promotion of Virtue and
Suppression of Vice) to brutally uphold its extreme and often unorthodox
interpretations of Islam, which were not previously known in Afghanistan.
Taliban philosophy, Ahmed Rashid notes,
. . . fitted nowhere in the Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged
in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994. . . . The Taliban represented nobody but
themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own. . . . Before the Taliban,
Islamic extremism had never flourished in Afghanistan.3
The people’s optimism soon turned to fear as the Taliban introduced a
stringent interpretation of sharia, banned women from work, and introduced
punishments such as death by stoning and amputations.
While Tajik resistance to the Taliban in the form of the Northern
Alliance held out throughout the Taliban period and retained Afghanistan’s
seat in the UN, the Taliban eventually conquered 80 percent of the country.4 By
September 2001, it was poised to perhaps wipe out the Northern Alliance. But
the 9/11 attacks led to U.S. intervention on October 7, 2001, aimed at
destroying Al Qaeda as well as removing the Taliban from Afghanistan.
Characteristics of the Taliban
The Taliban primarily consists of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai
confederation with some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht
confederation. Mullah Mohammed Omar Akhund and most of the senior
members of theTaliban are from theHotaki tribeof theGhilzai. Theirmovement
represents an ultraconservative Islamic front with an ideology derived from the
JOHNSON AND MASON
3Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 85, 93.
4Only three countries provided diplomatic recognition to the Taliban as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the UAE.
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Deobandi School (discussed below). The Taliban, however, took Deobandism
to extremes the school’s founders would not have recognized. The roots of the
Taliban are found in the mujahideen effort against the Soviets. From the
hundreds of resistance groups that sprang up, the ISID recognized seven and
established offices for them throughwhich to channel covert support. Although
most had a strong religious ethos, the groups were organized primarily along
ethnic and tribal lines. Significantly, three of the seven were led by Ghilzais and
none by their rivals, the Durranis, who were deliberately marginalized by the
ISID.5 The importance of these ethnic roots of the Taliban in the mujahideen
movement cannot be overstated. Yet its tribal heritage is only a partial explana-
tion of what the Taliban represents.
The Taliban’s Islamic Component
The Taliban initially represented a rise to power of the mullahs at the
expense of both tribal leaders and mujahideen commanders. Many mujahid-
een commanders, especially those from Hizb-i-Islami (Maulvi Khalis) and
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami–Islamic Unity Movement (Nabi Muhammadi), were
later absorbed by the Taliban.6 And, as noted, the Taliban was influenced by
the teachings of Deobandi Islam in Pakistani seminars and madrassas, espe-
cially the Jaamia Haqqania at Akora Khattack.7 The Pakistani version of the
Deobandi schools in Afghan refugee camps were for the most part run by
inexperienced, semiliterate mullahs associated with Pakistan’s JUI. Saudi funds
in combination with a lack of appreciation on the part of the mullahs of the
reformist Deobandi agenda brought the schools’ curricula closer to ultracon-
servative Wahhabism.8
Deobandi Islam, a conservative Islamic orthodoxy, follows a
Salafist egalitarian model that seeks to emulate the life and times of the
Prophet Mohammed.9 The Deobandi philosophy founded at the Dar ul-Ulum
Afghanistan
5 Rashid, Taliban, pp. 18–19; Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al
Qa’ida and the Holy War (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 70.
6 International Crisis Group, ‘‘Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation,’’ ICG Asia
Report, No. 62, Kabul/Brussels, Aug. 5, 2003, p. 17.
7Other seminaries outside the border areas that were important foundations for the Taliban
included ones in Karachi (Binori Town and Jamia Farooqia) and in Lahore (Jamia Ashrafia).
Similarly, there were important seminaries in Peshawar, Akora Khattack, and Quetta, which all
played a pivotal role in building up the Taliban movement. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘‘How the
Taliban Builds its Army, Asia Times, Aug. 27, 2003.
8 Ahmed Rashid, ‘‘The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,’’ Foreign Affairs, November/December
1999.
9 See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 2002); Barbara Metcalf, ‘‘The Madrassa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in
Modern India,’’ Modern Asian Studies, February 1978; and Usha Sanyal, ‘‘Generational Changes
in the Leadership of the Ahl-e Sunnat Movement in North India during the Twentieth Century,’’
Modern Asian Studies, July 1998).
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(Abode of Islamic Learning) madrassa in Deoband, India, in 1867 eventually
became the primary producer of Ulama, or legal scholars, in India. While
Deobandi madrassas have flourished across South Asia, they were not offi-
cially supported or sanctioned in Pakistan until President Zia ul Haq assumed
control of the Pakistani government in 1977. The Deobandi interpretation of
Islamic teachings is now widely practiced in Pakistan, with the JUI being its
primary political proponent.
The Deobandi interpretation holds that a Muslim’s primary obligation
and loyalty is to his religion. The Deobandis oppose any kind of social
caste system within Islam, to include, naturally, any monarchy. Loyalty to
country is always secondary. Deobandis also believe they have a sacred right
and obligation to wage jihad to protect the Muslims of any country. This
obligation alone may explain some of Mullah Omar’s affinity for Bin Laden
and his global jihadist ambitions. Many analysts believe that had the Taliban
remained in power, it was only a matter a time before they moved against
‘‘apostate’’ neighbors such as Uzbekistan. The Taliban had already embraced
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Uzbek regime’s primary jihadist
opposition.
Deobandi militants share the Taliban’s restrictive view of women and
regard Shia as non-Muslim. While in power the Taliban had a deliberate anti-
Shia program against Afghanistan’s ethnic Hazara, who are predominantly
Shia, and led numerous massacres against them, killing tens of thousands.10
The Taliban as a Tribal Movement
While the Taliban’s rise challenged many traditional tribal institutions,
especially those of Afghanistan’s easternmountains, the eventual leadership of
the movement consisted almost exclusively of Ghilzai Pashtuns. The Ghilzai
have historically been at odds with the smaller Durrani confederation of tribes,
which is currently represented to some extent in the central Afghan govern-
ment. Ghilzai Pashtuns are concentrated in the southeast—in Oruzgan, Zabol,
Dai Kundi and Gardez provinces, and in the Katawaz region of Paktika
province—but they also have communities in the center and north of the
country as a result of resettlement, both forcible and encouraged, under
Durrani rule in the early twentieth century.
The importance of the Ghilzai to the Taliban and insurgency is
illustrated by Figure 1. The shaded section of the map shows those areas
where the insurgency is the strongest—primarily areas controlled by the
Taliban. These areas include the northern districts of Kandahar Province,
the northeastern districts of the Helmand Province, the southern districts of
Oruzgan Province, the western districts of Zabol Province, and districts in
JOHNSON AND MASON
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Paktika, Paktya, Gardez, Wardak, and Logar Provinces. The inset map is a
rough sketch of the Pashtun tribal areas of the Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurghusht,
Karlanri, and Sarbani—the five large confederations of Pashtuns, each of
which traces its roots to a single ancestor. (Each of these five confederations
contains scores of major tribes, or Qawms, which are perhaps analogous to
Native American tribes such as the Apache or the Navajo.) Comparing the two
maps, it is evident that the most intense area of the insurgency is the area
dominated by the various Ghilzai tribes.
Tribalism in Afghanistan can be seen as a subset of ethno-linguistic
groups, giving primacy to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent. The tribe is a
kind of union of mutual assistance, with members cooperating on defense and
maintaining order.11 The Pashtun in particular are highly segmentary, with
precise patrilineal descents first written down by the Moghuls in the fifteenth
century. To truly understand the Taliban, we must thus go behind the mask of
Islamism (the Taliban’s opponents in the Northern Alliance were also
conservative Muslims) and examine the movement as a tribal phenomenon.
On closer inspection, the Taliban is neither simply a Pashtun movement nor
Afghanistan
Figure 1. Pashtun Tribal Areas and Key Insurgent Strongholds, 2006
11 See Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 1980, 2nd ed.).
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even a pan-Ghilzai movement, although its area of influence coincides closely
with Ghilzai lands. It is largely led by a single tribe. Most of the senior
leadership of the Taliban—with a few exceptions of Kakar tribesmen of the
Ghurghusht confederation, who are close to Mullah Omar—was and is drawn
specifically from Mullah Omar’s own Hotaki tribe (see Table 1).
There is historical precedent for this. The Ghilzai have traditionally
been hostile towards the Durrani, who have held power in Kabul for most of
the last three hundred years and provided all of Afghanistan’s kings. Only three
times have the Ghilzai seized national power from the Durranis: in 1721, when
Mir Wais took power; in 1978, after a coup against Mohammed Daoud by
Marxist military officers, who immediately handed over power to the Marxist
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan leader NurMohammed Taraki;12 and
again in 1996, when Mullah Omar came to power. Both Mir Wais and Mullah
Omar are of the Hotaki tribe. Afghans have an immediate and intimate
relationship to historical events: the events of 1721 are not forgotten to the
Ghilzai, and the anti-monarchist Deobandi Taliban movement was at some
level also a recreation of the triumph of the Hotakis over the hated Durrani
monarchs. Significantly, when the Taliban first became powerful, its instinct
was not to march immediately on the capital, but to subdue, coopt, and
subjugate the Durranis of Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. When the
Taliban seized control of Kabul, the exiled King Zahir Shah, a Durrani, was
not invited to return from Italy. This dynamic is still at work today: the priority
JOHNSON AND MASON
Table 1. Senior Taliban Leaders
Name Position Tribal Affiliation
Mullah Muhammad Omar Movement Leader Hotaki Ghilzai
Mullah Berader Deputy Movement Leader Ghilzai
Mullah Dadullah Kakar Senior Military Commander Kakar Ghurghusht
Mullah Mohammad Hassan Foreign Minister after 1997 Hotaki Ghilzai
Nuruddin Turabi Minister of Justice Hotaki Ghilzai
Alla Dad Akhund Minister of Communications Hotaki Ghilzai
Mohamed Essa Minister of Water and Power Hotaki Ghilzai
Wakil Ahmed Personal Secretary to Mullah Omar Kakar Ghurghusht
Sadeq Akhond Minister of Commerce Hotaki Ghilzai
Mohammed Rabbani Chairman of Kabul Shura Kakar Ghurghusht
Mullah Obaidullah Minister of Defense Hotaki Ghilzai
12 The competition and distrust between the Ghilzai and the Durranis played a major role in
the split of the PDPA between the Khalq (People) faction, led by Taraki and representing
Ghilzai Pashtuns and the Parcham (Banner) faction, led by Babrak Karmal and representing the
Durrani Pashtun. See Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke
University, 1985, 2nd ed.)
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of the resurgent Taliban in 2006 is not driving northeast towards Kabul and
bringing down the Karzai government, but rather focusing on first establishing
political dominance over Durrani lands in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.
Clearly more is at work here than a simple, radical Islamist movement bent on
seizing national power.
The Sociological Basis of the Taliban
Tribal politics and Pakistani support do not fully explain how the
Taliban was able to seize control so effectively. To gain power, it drew
unconsciously on a universally understood cultural phenomenon among
the frontier Pashtun,13 one that the British and later the Pakistanis encountered
over and over again: the charismatic mullah movement. Mullah Omar is the
archetype of this phenomenon, a cyclical pattern of insurrection which
manifests itself about every thirty years in the Pashtun belt. Indeed, such
leaders have often gained powers on the frontier during times of social
distress.14 These charismatic uprisings were so common, in fact, that the
British dubbed them ‘‘mad mullah movements.’’
There have been many. A similar figure to Mullah Omar, Mirza Ali
Khan—a Tori Khel Waziri who was known to the West as the Fakir of Ipi—led
first British and then Pakistani security forces on a frustrating chase around the
frontier for thirty years.15 Protected by his Pashtun tribal supporters in the hills,
much as Mullah Omar is today, he was never caught. The Mullah of Hadda, as
noted by David Edwards, provoked the Great Pashtun Revolt of 1897 through
mysticism, parlor tricks, and promises to turn British bullets to water.16 Akbar
Ahmed has studied the emergence of a charismatic Mullah in Waziristan who,
like Mullah Omar, challenged state legitimacy.17 Ahmed argues that the Mullah
of Waziristan also used mysticism to gain legitimacy, much like Mullah Omar
did thirty years later, and challenged Pakistan’s attempt to modernize the FATA.
Omar joined this rogues’ gallery of politicized insurgent mullahs by
means of a politico-religious stunt that is of enormous importance to the
Taliban movement. In so doing, he became the epitome of Max Weber’s
definition of the charismatic leader, who has:
Afghanistan
13 See Vanni Cappelli, ‘‘The Alienated Frontier: Why the United States Can’t Get Osama bin
Laden,’’ Orbis, Fall 2005.
14 For a seminal treatment of the subject of charismatic leadership and political organizations,
see Alfred de Grazia, Political Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1965), also published at
www.grazian-archive.com.
15Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 480, 487, 491–2.
16David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley,
Cal.: University of California, 1996).
17 Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (London: Routledge, 1991). Also see
Akbar S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan
(Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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. . . a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the
ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis
of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. . . .18
The eventwasOmar’s removal in 1994 of a sacred garment believedby
many Afghans to be the original cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammed
from its sanctuary in Kandahar, and his wearing it while standing atop a
mosque in the city. Whereas Omar had been a nonentity before this piece of
religious theatre, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical
power (at least among the 90 percent of Pashtuns who are illiterate) and
resulted in his being locally proclaimed Amir-ul Momineen (the Leader of the
Faithful).19
What is known of the Taliban subsequent to this event conforms
exactly to the ‘‘mad mullah’’ pattern of social mobilization. Furthermore, once
in power, Taliban power was (and is) concentrated exclusively in the person
of Mullah Omar, another characteristic of the phenomenon—and contrary to
traditional Pashtun shura (consensus) politics. As Rashid has observed, Omar
ultimately made all the decisions within the Taliban, and no one dared act
without his orders.20 Today, Mullah Omar issues statements of encouragement
to his field commanders, rather than operational orders, exactly as did the
Mullah of Hadda.21 Thus, unlike most insurgencies, which are not centered in
the personality of a single leader, the Taliban’s center of gravity, in Clause-
witzian terms, is not Taliban foot soldiers or field commanders or even the
senior clerics around Omar, but Omar himself. Because it is a charismatic
movement socially, if Mullah Omar dies, the Taliban, at least in its current
incarnation, will wither and die. The mystical charismatic power that came
from wearing the Cloak of the Prophet is not something transferable to a
second-in-command. Unfortunately, because this phenomenon is so alien to
Western thinking, U.S. analysts instead generally interpret the Taliban in terms
more compatible with Western logic.
Labeling the Taliban an Islamist movement, a drug gang, or any of the
other revolving-door euphemisms often used, including lately ‘‘anti-govern-
ment militia,’’ is misguided. Understanding the Taliban more precisely could
enable better U.S. military Information and Psychological Operations, for
example, or insights into the human terrain by U.S. and NATO forces, and would
JOHNSON AND MASON
18Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, translated by A.M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 358–59, 362.
19 The cloak of the Prophet Mohammed was folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a
crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar; ‘‘myth had it that the padlocks to the crypt could be
opened only when touched by a true Amir-ul Momineen.’’ Joseph A. Raelin, ‘‘The Myth of
Charismatic Leaders,’’ T&D, March 2003.
20 Rashid, Taliban.
21 Edwards, Heroes of the Age.
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suggest a realignment of reconstruction priorities to isolate the movement and
prevent further mobilization.
A Deteriorating Situation in Afghanistan
More than 340 American soldiers and Marines have been killed in
action in Afghanistan.22 While the overall level of conflict in Afghanistan has
not yet approached that experienced in Iraq, the last few years have witnessed
an acceleration of increasingly deadly attacks that have begun to graft
insurgent tactics in Iraq onto classic mujahideen-style guerrilla warfare.23 In
the first five months of 2006, there was a 200 percent increase in insurgent
attacks compared to the first five months of 2005. Indeed, late May 2006 saw
the deadliest week in the country in five years. Lutfullah Mashal, the former
Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman, observed in May 2006 that ‘‘Taliban
fighters no longer rely solely on hit-and-run tactics by small groups of
guerrillas. Instead, the Taliban have been concentrating into groups of more
than 100 fighters to carry out frontal assaults on government security posts.’’24
The Taliban is thought to have at least 12,000 fighters controlling areas in the
provinces of Oruzgan, Helmand, Zabol and Kandahar.25
Troubling indicators such as the relatively free movement of insurgent
groups reveal that increasingly large areas of the east and south of the country
are falling under the control of the Taliban. Said Jawad, Afghanistan’s ambas-
sador to the United States, recently stated, ‘‘We have lost a lot of the ground
that we may have gained in the country, especially in the south. . . . The fact
that U.S. military resources have been ‘diverted’ to the war in Iraq is of course
hurting Afghanistan.’’26
Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies are gaining strength. There
have been numerous attacks in 2006 in areas other than the south and east,
suggesting that the Taliban has expanded the scope of its operations and is
taking the war to the north. Cross-border operations from Pakistan are
commonplace. NATO, which assumed operational control of the war in
2006, requested more troops to fight the insurgency in September; U.S. troop
levels are expected to at least remain at their current level.27
Another source of concern is that recent insurgent attacks include the
use of suicide bombings, a tactic previously unknown in Afghanistan and rare
Afghanistan
22 For current figures, see www.icasualties.org.
23 Griff Witte, ‘‘Afghans Confront Surge In Violence: Foreign Support Seen Behind Attacks
That Mimic Those in Iraq,’’ Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 2005.
24 Ron Synovitz, ‘‘Afghanistan: Upsurge of Violence Reflects New Taliban Tactics,’’ Eurasia
Insight, May 26, 2006.
25 Center for International Issues Research, Daily Arabic Media Report, May 25, 2006.
26 ‘‘Taliban, Al-Qaeda regroup in Afghanistan, defying U.S. strategy,’’ Onlinenews.com, May
19, 2006.
27 Anne Gearan, ‘‘NATO adding troops in Afghanistan,’’ AP, Sept. 21, 2006.
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because of a cultural aversion to suicide,28 and improvised explosive devises
(IEDs), which demonstrate a significant level of coordination with Iraqi
insurgents and growing technological sophistication. The great majority of
the recent suicide attacks appear to have been ‘‘outsourced’’ to non-Afghans,
most often to Punjabis from the south of Pakistan and young foreign Islamists.
The wild and largely unregulated tribal areas on Pakistan’s northern
border play an extremely important role in the insurgency, as they do in
Kashmir and in the rising unrest that challenges Pakistani security forces and
governmental authority all along the frontier. They provide a steady source of
recruits, a safe haven for senior leadership, and a base of operations and
training for the Taliban, Al Qaeda affiliates, and, to a lesser degree, HiG.29
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Problem
For decades Afghanistan’s neighboring states have produced disen-
chanted groups such as Uyghurs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Islamists who have
used the country for guerrilla training and an operating base. The most
important foreign actors in Afghanistan’s affairs have come from Pakistan’s
western border provinces, especially the NWFP, Baluchistan, and the FATA.
Pakistan has long sought to exert influence in Afghanistan in order to achieve
‘‘strategic depth’’ on its northern border in the event of any conflict with
India.30 Successive Pakistani governments have promoted Islamic radicalism
to subvert Pashtun and Baluch nationalist movements and further their
ambitions in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Also important is the fact that
Afghanistan’s Pashtun population spills over into Pakistan’s FATA as well as
NWFP. Jihad, drugs, and gunrunning have long been the main sources of
livelihood for many of the Pashtuns living in the FATA.31 Afghan refugee camps
and thousands of madrassas opened by the JUI provide a steady flow of recruits
for the Taliban and other radical groups.
The minimal U.S. troop presence in the south means that the rugged,
porous, and often ill-defined 2,450 km border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan does not even constitute a speed bump to groups such as the
Taliban and Al Qaeda seeking to increase their influence among the Pashtun
JOHNSON AND MASON
28Griff Witte, ‘‘Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in Afghanistan, Violence in South Is Seen as
Message to NATO,’’ Washington Post Foreign Service, Jan. 17, 2006. For a chronology of suicide
bombings in Afghanistan, see www.rferl.org.
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tribesmen in the region. By mid-2005, in the strategically vital border province
of Paktika, for example, which has a population of some 700,000 people and
shares a 400 km border with Pakistan, the United States had only two
companies of light infantry and no engineers or aviation assets. In the summer
of 2005, the fledgling PRT in Paktika was dismembered due to personnel
shortages. A vestigial civil affairs remnant, its Civil Military Operations Center
(CMOC), was co-located with a maneuver company.
President Karzai and Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta recently
blamed the ISID for Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. Kabul claims that Pakistani
security forces chase Al Qaeda terrorists within Pakistan butmake little effort to
arrest Taliban fighters or stop them from crossing the border into Afghani-
stan.32 This lack of cooperation has similarly frustrated the United States. As
Henry A. Crumpton, the U.S. Department of State coordinator for counter-
terrorism, asserts:
The Americans are finding the Pakistanis much more reluctant to face down
the Taliban—who are brethren from the Pashtun ethnic group that dominates in
Afghanistan—than they have been to confront Al Qaeda, who are largely outsiders.
Has Pakistan done enough? I think the answer is no. . . . Not only Al Qaeda, but
Taliban leadership are primarily in Pakistan, and the Pakistanis know that.33
In 2004, after negotiating with tribal spokesmen, Pakistan responded
to rising FATA Islamic militancy with an unprecedented deployment of a
reported 70,000 troops to the border area. In Baluchistan, this force is led
by the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps and regular army elements from
Pakistan’s 12th Corps. The Pakistani campaign in the FATA, especially in the
North and South Waziristan Agencies, is being conducted by a battalion-plus
Special Operations Task Force and elements of the Pakistani Army’s 11th
Corps, aided by the paramilitary Scouts units of the Frontier Corps indigenous
to those agencies. While such troop levels greatly exceed the total number of
U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the actual relationship between
Pakistan’s campaign and the U.S. war on terror is controversial and unclear,
as suggested by Pakistan’s Gen Tariq Majid, the army’s chief of general staff:
‘‘We are not fighting America’s war in the FATA. It is in our own interest. We’re
fighting this war because, unfortunately, there have been fallout effects in
Pakistan from the instability in Afghanistan.’’34 Recently Islamabad signed the
Miranshah ‘‘peace agreement’’ in North Waziristan, seemingly in an attempt to
control militants and their ‘‘guest fighters,’’ who have been operating against
NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as Pakistani forces in the FATA; similar
agreements in 2004 and 2005 did virtually nothing to stop cross-border
movements of the Taliban and other insurgents. This most recent ‘‘peace
agreement’’ basically represents a formal Pakistani surrender to the Waziris
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and their humiliating retreat from Waziristan, which is now for all intents and
purposes an independent country with an independent foreign policy. The
Telegraph and other sources report that Mullah Omar played a ‘‘key’’ role in
brokering this deal. Indeed, Lateef Afridi, a tribal elder and former Pakistan
national assembly member, suggests that theWaziri would not have signed the
agreement if they had not asked been by Mullah Omar. ‘‘This is no peace
agreement, it is accepting Taliban rule in Pakistan’s territory.’’35 This agree-
ment will likely embolden the Taliban to launch even more lethal attacks in
Afghanistan.
The border areas are not the only driver of Pakistan’s strategic view of
Afghanistan. Its perception of an ongoing threat from India has helped shape
its Afghanistan policy. Having a friendly and controllable neighbor on
Pakistan’s western border is critical, allowing Pakistan to focus on its eastern
borderwith India. Afghanistan has also been influenced by Pakistan’s strategy
towards India-controlled Kashmir. One veteran Pakistani observer suggests
that ‘‘the Kashmir issue became the prime mover behind Pakistan’s Afghan
policy and its support to the Taliban.’’36 Camps in Afghanistan created during
the anti-Soviet jihad have beenused to trainKashmiri guerrilla forces. Pakistan
has used these jihadist forces as a bargaining chip with India in an attempt to
gain more autonomy and even independence from India for Kashmir.
Postconflict Reconstruction and the Rise of the Taliban Phoenix37
Afghanistan today is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of
insurgency, terrorism, narcotics,38 and warlords. Benign neglect by the United
States since Spring 2003 has brought Afghanistan back to the brink of state
failure. Washington has shortchanged Afghanistan in both personnel and
resources. The deployment of U.S. troops and NATO International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) dedicated to the stabilization of the countryside
represented the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel
to any postconflict environment since the end of World War II. The ratios of
peacekeepers to citizens in the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example,
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were 1:48 and 1:58, respectively. For the first three years in Afghanistan, the
comparable figure hovered near 1:2000. Today, with an increase in U.S. force
levels and a major reinforcement of the ISAF mission, it is roughly one
peacekeeper to every 1,000 Afghans (1:1000).
The number of ISAF personnel deployed after the December 2001 Bonn
Agreement on rebuilding Afghanistan was completely inadequate to fill the
security vacuum left by the retreating Taliban, which gap was quickly filled by
warlords and drug lords, many of whom have since donned national police
uniforms to facilitate narco-trafficking.39 As bad as they are, however, the
numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Most of the U.S. Special Forces
soldiers who best understand counterinsurgency were soon pulled out of
Afghanistan to serve in Iraq and elsewhere. Aviation assets have also been
drawn down to minimal levels. Because of the lack of helicopter assets, quick-
reaction forces throughout much of the south are forced to respond to the
scene of minor Taliban attacks in Humvees. With an average overland speed of
5–10 miles an hour (over rocky trails that have not improved), Taliban
guerrillas are usually long gone from their ‘‘roadblock-and-run’’ attacks before
U.S. forces arrive, which emboldens the insurgents, demonstrates to the locals
our inability to protect them, and demoralizes the police, few of whom are
willing to try to hold off hardened and heavily armed Taliban veterans for
several hours with poor-quality weapons and the standard 30 rounds of issued
ammunition.
Evenmore damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of
the Taliban was the shockingly low level of committed funding to rebuild a
country laid waste by twenty-five years of war. The Karzai government was
well into its third year in office before cumulative U.S. expenditures on
reconstruction and development passed the $1 billion mark. The aid budget
for Afghanistan for 2006 was less than $700 million. After subtracting the one
major reconstruction project undertaken, the repaving of the Kabul toKandahar
road, annual U.S. aid to Afghanistan over the last five years has averaged just $13
per Afghan. The United States is spending more money every 72 hours on the
war in Iraq than it is spending on Afghan reconstruction this year.
Frequent turnovers of personnel, lack of local funds, a cumbersome
approval process for projects implemented by U.S. headquarters in Bagram,
the absence of construction oversight and quality control, inadequate vetting
of contractors, and endemic corruption have combined to waste much of what
was spent. The PRT effort has provided a laboratory for U.S. Army Civil Affairs
experimentation, but their numbers are absurdly inadequate. With an approx-
imate overall troop-to-task ratio of one PRT in Pashtun areas for every 1 million
Pashtuns, the strategic impact is negligible. In 2005, in the lawless Paktika
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province, where no international organizations will operate, eight American
civil affairs enlisted reservists and two mid-career transfer civil affairs majors
were responsible for all rural development and reconstruction in an area the
size of Vermont and New Hampshire combined with a population of 700,000
people whose living conditions are largely unchanged since biblical times.
With a miniscule Commander’s Emergency Response Program budget,
what any ten soldiers can accomplish amounts at best to a few grains of sand
on the beach. In 2005, the entire province of Paktika had only a handful of
buildings not made of adobe, fewer than a dozen high school graduates, and
no telephones or paved roads. There were two antiquated clinics and two
doctors. Officially, the province has 352 elementary schools for boys, but only
40 actual school buildings. The rest of the ‘‘schools’’ were simply patches of
open ground in the village where the sixth graders taught what they knew to
the first graders. Few if any girls went to school. Ten civil affairs personnel with
three Humvees and a few hundred thousand dollars could change little. In fact,
in the first four years of the Karzai government, the U.S. government had not
built a single school or clinic anywhere in the province. To make matters
worse, due to manpower shortages, the PRT in Paktika and seven others have
now been effectively disbanded, with their support elements redeployed to
other duties, and the handful of civil affairs soldiers of the CMOC rolled together
with combat maneuver elements onto shared firebases, where they are
generally the lowest priority for missions and assets. In these cases, the PRTs,
originally designed as independent, free-standing civil-military affairs institu-
tions, no longer exist. The stated mission of the PRT, to ‘‘extend the reach of the
Afghan national government to the rural areas,’’ is itself a case of Kafkaesque
spin, because specific Afghan PRT involvement is extremely rare. Hence, their
missions, for the most part, lack any Afghan government component. The
inevitable failure of this low level of peacekeeping and reconstruction to effect
any meaningful improvement in the lives of the people in the rural south has
created an angry environment of unfulfilled expectations. As much or more
than the Karzai government’s inability to extend its writ beyond Kabul, this gap
between expectation and reality is what has opened the door to the resurgence
of the Taliban.
Assessing the Afghan Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
The Taliban, unlike Kabul, intuitively understood that the center of
gravity was satisfying the rural Pashtun. They knew there was a window of
opportunity for Karzai to gain rural Pashtun support, and they were quick to
capitalize on the U.S. Department of Defense’s failure to understand this.
Indeed, the DoD saw the aftermath of the Taliban’s withdrawal south of the
border as a simple matter of subtractive math: ‘‘Kill the existing insurgents and
terrorists until the number reaches zero and the war is over.’’ But an attempted
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war of attrition in this context is a nonstarter. For its part, the Taliban today is
conducting a brilliant defensive insurgency. They have deployed enough low-
level fighters to intimidate the NGOs and international organizations into
withdrawing their personnel from the south. By night, Taliban mullahs travel
in the rural areas, speaking to village elders. They are fond of saying, ‘‘The
Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time.’’ The simple message
they deliver in person or by ‘‘night letter’’ is one of intimidation: ‘‘The
Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually they
will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every
family that has collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government.’’
Such a message is devastatingly effective in these areas, where transgenera-
tional feuds and revenge are a fabric of the society. The insurgency has
recently regained major footholds across the southern region of the country in
areas ranging from Helmand to Ghazni.
Combined with the lack of any tangible reason to support either the
Americans or Karzai, the villagers either remain neutral or provide assistance to
the guerrillas. U.S. forces have often accelerated this process through culturally
obtuse behavior, unnecessarily invasive and violent tactics, and a series of
tragic incidents of ‘‘collateral damage’’ which are inevitable in wartime. U.S.
forces deploying to Afghanistan still receive only minimal cultural awareness
briefings, if any, and this training is usually the lowest priority on the checklist
of requirements to be crossed off before deployment. Few, if any, can speak a
word of the Pashto language. They primarily rely on trilingual young Tajik
interpreters to communicate with Pashtun elders, a major source of miscom-
munication.
At the strategic level, the Taliban is fighting a classic ‘‘war of the flea,’’40
largely along the same lines used by the mujahideen twenty years ago against
the Soviets, including fighting in villages to deliberately provoke air strikes and
collateral damage. They gladly trade the lives of a few dozen guerrilla fighters
in order to cost the American forces the permanent loyalty of that village,
under the code of Pashtun social behavior called Pashtunwali and its obliga-
tion for revenge (Badal), which the U.S. Army does not even begin to
understand. The advent of suicide attacks is particularly alarming. The Taliban
is getting American forces to do exactly what they want them to do: chase
illiterate teenage boys with guns around the countryside like the dog chasing
its tail and gnawing at each flea bite until it drops from exhaustion. The
Taliban, however, has a virtually infinite number of guerrilla recruits pouring
out of the Deobandi madrassas and growing up in the Pashtun Afghan refugee
camps in northern Pakistan. It could sustain casualties of 10,000 or more
guerrillas a year for twenty years without any operational impact. Indeed, the
Pashtun, who make up 100 percent of the Taliban, have a saying: ‘‘Kill
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one enemy, make ten.’’ Thus, the death in battle of a Pashtun guerrilla invokes
an obligation of revenge among all his male relatives, making the killing of a
Taliban guerrilla an act of insurgent multiplication, not subtraction. The Soviets
learned this lesson as they killed nearly a million Pashtuns but only increased
the number of Pashtun guerrillas by the end of the war. The Taliban center of
gravity is Mullah Omar, the charismatic cult leader, not teenage boys or mid-
level commanders, and no amount of killing them will shut the insurgency
down.
The priority of U.S. effort is still what the Taliban desires, on the
so-called ‘‘kill/capture mission,’’ and the U.S. Army spends much of its time on
battalion-sized sweep operations (e.g., Operations Mountain Thrust, Medusa,
Red Wings, and Pil). Although few if any insurgencies have ever been won by
killing insurgents, this remains the primary strategy. Indeed, media reporting
of the conflict in 2006 indicates an increasing U.S. return to the success metric
of body counts, a haunting and disturbing echo of the same failure in Vietnam.
In short, the United States is losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village
at a time, bursting into schoolyards full of children with guns bristling, kicking
in village doors, searching women, speeding down city streets, and putting out
cross-cultural gibberish in totally ineffectual InfoOps and PsyOps cam-
paigns—all of which are anathema to the Afghans.
Conclusion
Without a major change in counterinsurgency strategy and a major
increase in manpower, equipment (particularly aviation assets), and especially
reconstruction funding, the United States may lose this war. Today, the
momentum—particularly in the counterinsurgency and the counternarcotics
efforts—is running the wrong way. It is still possible to win—to create a slowly
developing yet stable, conservative Islamic democracy in Afghanistan, one
generally free of terrorism—but not with the current resources and tactics. The
Taliban has numerous advantages, including comprehensive knowledge of
the local culture, language, and tribal hierarchies of which U.S. forces are
ignorant; a virtually inexhaustible supply of recruits and money; mountainous
terrain that favors the insurgent; centuries of successful experience in guerrilla
warfare against Western powers; patience; domination to the point of supre-
macy in Information Warfare, and perhaps most importantly, ready sanctuary
in much of northern Pakistan.
Major changes in the way the United States is doing business are
needed immediately, but even with them, the United States cannot do it alone.
It needs not just the energetic support of NATO but a sustained commitment
from NATO to the hard business of counterinsurgency, a type of warfare in
which NATO has had little training and almost no experience. The UN, NGOs,
and the donor nations must do more as well. And Afghanistan’s northern and
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western neighbors must continue to avoid the urge to excessively meddle in
Afghan affairs or risk a future of Islamist terrorism exported from Afghanistan.
But the key to success or failure in Afghanistan lies below its southern
border, in northern Pakistan. As long as insurgents are virtually free to cross the
border at will and Pakistani Frontier Corps elements aid and abet their
movements, the insurgency cannot be shut down in Afghanistan. As the
Soviets learned, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be
easily closed. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf must stop trying to appear
to be the ally of the United States in the war on terror while seeking to curry
political favor with its worst proponents in the NWFP, Baluchistan, and the FATA.
Thanks to ill-conceived Pakistani policies of encouragement and appease-
ment, fundamentalist Islam in the border region may now be too powerful to
stop, but it’s not too late to try. President Musharraf must assert national control
there and act boldly to shut down the major insurgent movements across the
border before the situation spirals completely out of control.
For its part, the United States must begin to fight smarter and stop
following the Taliban playbook. A complete change in counterinsurgency
strategy is required, and all U.S. soldiers must become cultural and language
warriors with months, not minutes, of training in both language and culture
before deployment. Quantum improvement is required in this area; already in
2004 Human Rights Watch had released a scathing report on the conduct
of American military personnel and the Afghan National Police,41 which
are an almost unmitigated disaster of corruption, warlord cronyism, and
incompetence.
Despite extreme poverty, a landmine-littered landscape, massive
corruption, a fledgling government whose authority outside of Kabul is very
limited, an ongoing insurgency, a shattered economy, booming opium pro-
duction, and a host of other daunting problems, Afghanistan remains geos-
trategically vital. The United States cannot repeat its post-Soviet withdrawal
abandonment of the country or fob the mission off on NATO, or the results will
be disastrous once again. By abandoning Afghanistan once, the United States
allowed the country to become a refuge for terrorist groups to recruit,
train, and wage war against the West. The effect on Afghanistan,
the region, and the rest of the world was dramatic and terrifying. This
time, if we leave—or lose—the results will be even worse.
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